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This paper places the development of regulatory strategies dealing with 
the growth of online investing in Canada in the context of theoretical debates 
about governance through risk. It examines aspects of this emerging regulation 
relating to (i) use of the Internet by issuers for document delivery; (ii) 
application of investment suitability rules to online trading; (iii) emergence of 
new electronic- trading markets. These regulatory developments are 
considered in terms of the extent to which they exhibit features suggesting: (a) 
an increased decentring of the state; (b) a shift to risk governance as an 
end of regulating. The paper argues for the need to pay careful attention to 
the politics of decentring and risk governance in assessing the emerging 




Online investing  is arguably the quintessential  “new economy” activity, 
involving as it does the marriage of information and technology in pursuit 
of what Castells calls “informational capitalism” (Castells 2000: 161). While 
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the demise of the new economy has been proclaimed by many (Economy 
and Society 2001), there are still compelling reasons to pay attention to the 
issue of the regulation of online investing, not least of which is the 
possibility for retail investors to lose money through the use of 
technological tools that are not widely understood (Bradley 2004). As 
detailed in this volume, a number of jurisdictions around the world have 
addressed aspects of online investing over the last few years. One of the 
objectives of this paper is to describe Canadian forays into this field of 
securities regulation, for comparative purposes. In the Ontario context1 
regulators have attended to the online activities of those who issue 
securities for trading (issuers), but have focused more intensively on the 
consequences of online investing for both the broker/investor relationship 
and for the markets for trading themselves. These regulatory developments 
will be described in Parts III and IV of the paper. However, these examples 
of regulatory change also offer the opportunity to consider some timely 
questions about the nature of regulation in the neo-liberal state. Part II of 
this paper charts the theoretical ground to be brought to bear on 
understanding the regulation of online investing in Canada. 
 
 
II. THEORETICAL  APPROACHES 
 
The “new economy” of the last several decades held out the promise of 
using technology to transform the way business was done throughout the 
economy. As Castells puts it, “the new economy is/will be predicated on a 
 
surge in productivity growth resulting from the ability to use new 
information technology in powering a knowledge-based production 
system” (Castells 2000: 161). The emphasis in the new economy was on 
innovation, networking, entrepreneurialism, and competition. Critical 
commentators have noted that these developments have not been without 
social cost, in the form of more contingent and insecure labor markets, 
along with increased social inequality and exclusion (ibid.). In the specific 
context of capital markets, finance was transformed by the liberalization of 
rules relating to the types of financial transactions that could be 
conducted within firms, as well as the possibility of more broadly based 
banking, insurance, and securities transactions. Information technology 
itself also changed the complexity of, and manner in which, financial 
transactions could be conducted and the types of financial products that 
could be sold. As Caroline Bradley notes, information about securities 
trading opportunities and about the business entities issuing those securities 
is now available more immediately and arguably in a more user-friendly 
manner than in the pre-Internet era (Bradley 2004). 
If the “new economy” is one metanarrative purporting to describe the 
reconfiguration of social and economic space in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century, another is the so-called “risk society” thesis. In Ulrich 
Beck’s first account of the risk society (Beck 1992: 19) he proposed that “in 
advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically 
accompanied by the social production of risks. Accordingly, the problems 
and conflicts relating to distribution in a society of scarcity overlap with the 
problems and conflicts that arise from the production, definition, and 
 
distribution of techno-scientifically produced risks,” whether the problem 
is, for example, BSE or global warming. In this account, technology creates 
as many problems as the opportunities it enables. For Beck, “the discourse 
of risk begins where trust in our security and belief in progress ends” 
(Beck 2000: 213). Thus, the future, more than the past, becomes “the 
cause of present-day experience and action.” Individuals become oriented 
towards governing themselves so as to avoid potential future risks, such as 
disease or poverty in old age. As Dean has pointed out, analysts have 
taken two approaches to the study of risk as it relates to modern society. 
One approach, exemplified by Beck, is to understand risk as a “feature 
of the ontological condition of humans” (Dean 1999: 178) within 
modernity. The other is to address it as a “governmental rationality” 
(ibid.: 176), that is a discourse and set of practices connected to the 
“regulation, management and shaping of human conduct” (ibid.: 178). 
From this vantage point, attention might be paid to what Rose calls “an 
industry of risk,” for whom the characterizing and subsequent assuaging 
of fears for the future is a profit opportunity (Rose 1999). Furthermore, 
in this second account, risk as a technique for the governance of 
populations is congruent with the political project of neo-liberalism, 
which emphasizes individual responsibility, entrepreneurship, the pre-
eminence of markets, and the withdrawal of the state from the 
provision of various forms of social insurance and various interventions 
in the economy (Condon 2002; Ericson & Haggerty 1997; McCluskey 
2002). Making this connection between risk governance and neo-
liberalism also allows us to see that in actual examples of governance 
 
through risk, what is at issue is the material distribution of risks in 
particular ways (Condon 2002; McCluskey 2002). 
What is the place of law and regulation in these socio-economic 
metanarratives? There is now some consensus in the literature on neo-
liberal practices in various jurisdictions that attempts at deregulation, 
supposed to result from a neo-liberal agenda, often led in fact to specific 
forms of reregulation (Braithwaite 2000: 204). For example, despite the 
fact that online investing can contribute to neo-liberal goals, such as 
increasing competition among suppliers of trading platforms or allowing 
individual investors to prepare for retirement more autonomously, the 
enterprise is being regulated in many jurisdictions. It has been argued 
that the general form that this re-regulation has taken has been a shift 
away from models of command and control via a central state apparatus 
(Black 2001). What is tending to replace this is regulation accomplished 
using contractual arrangements, codes of conduct, self-regulation, and other 
more low visibility (and compliance-oriented) mechanisms, that is, so-called 
decentered regulation.2 This development raises a number of important 
questions, not least of which is, as pursued by Kingsford Smith (2004), 
the implications of the shift to decentered regulation for traditional 
notions of accountability to the rule of law. Given the claims of the 
metanarrative of governance through risk, it is also worth addressing more 
precisely the connection, if any, between governance through risk and 
decentered regulation. To what extent have regulatory forms in specific 
fields empirically begun to shift to a discourse of governance through risk 
(Condon 2002)? Relatedly, does the phenomenon of decentered regulation 
 
consequent on the dismantling of traditional state mechanisms for 
regulating in fact presage a change in the ends as well as the means of 
regulating? Connected to this is the extent to which the phenomenon of 
decentered regulation changes the terms of debate about the formation of 
specific regulatory approaches to dealing with novel issues, such as the 
growth of online investing. Such debate, in a command and control 
context, has traditionally investigated the role of private or public 
interests in explaining the outcomes of state regulatory policy or 
rulemaking (Condon 1998; Hawkins & Thomas 1989; Scott 2001). 
However, a critique of the “governing at a distance” perspective, which 
argues for deemphasizing the role of the state in accomplishing the 
governance of populations (Rose 1999), is that it does not pay enough 
attention to “politics, contestation and implementation” in explaining the 
formation of specific regulatory initiatives (Callinicos 1999; O’Malley, 
Weir & Shearing 1997). For example, is risk governance a feature of 
the terms in which debate about the formation of regulatory codes for 
governing online investing is conducted? The examples of policy and rule 
formation in the area of online investing discussed below can be used to 
illuminate these questions about decentered regulation and risk 
governance. 
 
III. INVESTORS, ISSUERS, AND BROKERS 
 
The take-up of online investing opportunities in Canada appears never to 
have been as vigorous as in the U.S., certainly in those heady days a few 
 
years ago when Internet trading looked like it might rival the popularity of 
conventional trading. The Toronto Stock Exchange’s (now the TSX) 
Canadian Shareowners Study for 2000 indicated that Canadian shareholders 
were “tapping into the Internet at a rapid rate and see the Internet as a 
crucial source for investment information. For the growing number of 
people who have tried on-line trading, it has become the overwhelming 
method of choice” (Market Probe Canada 2000). More specifically, the 
TSX also reported that 11 percent of shareowners had conducted on-line 
trades in that year. When the TSX study was updated in 2002, it was 
reported that although there has been an overall decrease in share 
ownership in Canada for the first time in twenty years, that “(t)he Internet 
continues to become a more prevalent means for shareowners to obtain 
information and conduct transactions, and for many has replaced more 
conventional channels and become the method of choice.” The study 
went on to predict, however, that “future growth of this medium . . . 
[would] be more gradual than it has been” (Market Probe Canada 2002). 
Meanwhile, as Bradley (2004) notes the official regulatory line on 
technological developments and the information economy is to describe 
them as “providing investors with empowerment” although investors are 
also cautioned to “understand the difference between investing and 
gambling” (Wetston 1999). Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) Vice-
Chair Wetston argued that technology can help reduce the “discrepancy in 
the information available to large and small investors” and online trading 
“lowers costs to investors and opens up trading to more investors” 
(ibid.). On the other hand, “it may fool inexperienced or small investors 
 
into believing they can “play with the big guys.” In particular, Wetston 
expressed a concern that the “reliance invited by the securities industry 
when it holds itself out to consumers as primarily an advice provider 
should be matched by an appropriate level of accountability and 
responsibility.” The investor education section of the OSC’s own website 
includes a number of information sheets on the subject of Internet 
investing, on the topics of investment information and scams, as well as 
how-to guides. When addressing retail investors directly, the regulatory 
approach is clearly to alert investors to the risks involved in using the 
Internet for obtaining information or trading.3 Is the investor-oriented risk-
based approach maintained in policy discussions concerning the 
investor/broker relationship and alternative markets for trading securities? 
This issue will be taken up below by examining regulatory initiatives in 
relation to issuers, brokers, and marketplaces. 
 
A. REGULATION OF ISSUERS 
National Policies (NP) 11–201 and 47–201 were effected in December 1999, 
with the objective of providing guidance to issuers and registrants about the 
approach that would be taken by the Canadian Securities Administrators 
(CSA) to the use of the Internet to satisfy various document disclosure and 
delivery requirements. It is a staple of many regimes of securities regulation 
that the initial issuance of securities to investors should be accompanied by 
detailed information about the nature of the securities, the business entity 
issuing them and its financial status, as well as the “risk factors” involved in 
 
investing in that enterprise.4 National Policy 11–201 supports the electronic 
delivery of such documents provided certain requirements are satisfied. 
These revolve around notice of delivery to the recipient, easy access of the 
recipient to the document, the deliverer being able to show that the 
document was delivered, and the non-corruption of the document in the 
delivery process. The CSA indicates that most of these requirements may 
be satisfied by the deliverer obtaining the prior consent of the intended 
recipient to electronic delivery. A deliverer may effect electronic delivery 
without consent, but does so “at the risk of bearing a more difficult 
evidentiary burden of proving that the first three components of 
electronic delivery were satisfied” (Notice of National Policy 11–201, 
§2.1(5)). Also, reference to a third-party provider of the document will 
likely “not constitute valid delivery in the absence of consent.”5 The CSA 
was originally hostile to the use of hyperlinks in relation to electronic 
delivery of a prospectus (ibid.), but in the final form of the policy it is 
content to note the risks involved for the issuer in using hyperlinks 
(including the fact that it becomes liable for the accuracy of hyperlinked 
material) along with the suggestion that care should be taken by the issuer 
to ensure that recipients are clear which of the documents being 
delivered constitute the prospectus. All of this is taken by commentators as 
evidence that the CSA is reluctant to move away from a restrictive stance 
of “regulating by analogy” to paper in the context of document delivery 
(Anand 2001). OSC Vice-Chair Wetston said in an April 2000 speech that, 
“These policies were deliberately not formulated as a rule in order to give 
market participants flexibility about how they would use electronic means 
 
for delivery and distribution” (Wetston 2000). The approach, therefore, is a 
familiar one in Canadian securities regulation, whereby the state regulator 
is involved in establishing general guidelines, but room for maneuver is 
still exercisable by issuers, for example, in how to “take care” in 
delineating the scope of the prospectus. 
National Policy 47–201 deals with two further matters relating to the use 
of the Internet in  connection with trades  and distributions  in securities. 
These are: (i) how use of the Internet impacts on jurisdictional questions; 
and (ii) the approach to be taken to the conduct of “roadshows”6 over the 
Internet. The explicit premise of this Policy is that “statutory requirements 
should not change as a result of the involvement of the Internet” (National 
Policy 47–201). In relation to the first issue, a “prominent disclaimer” and 
“reasonable precautions” will suffice to avoid the jurisdiction of the OSC. 
With respect to the latter, roadshows are acceptable, as long as they are 
conducted similarly to the procedure for a non-Internet roadshow. This 
includes the stricture that everyone receiving a transmission must have 
received a preliminary prospectus, access to a transmission should be 
controlled, and all viewers should agree not to reproduce the transmission. 
Meanwhile, in relation to secondary market disclosure by issuers (i.e., 
post-initial issue of the securities), in May 2001 the CSA proposed 
introducing a new National Policy dealing with disclosure standards, 
which has now been adopted in Ontario. The impetus for this policy was 
regulatory concern about the issue of selective disclosure of information 
by issuers to analysts, institutional investors, and other market 
participants, which was perceived to pose “a serious threat to investor 
 
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the capital markets” (Request 
for Comments 2001: 3301). A further specific purpose of the policy is to 
“assist companies in managing their disclosure obligations and minimize 
the risk of breaching securities law by highlighting some risky 
disclosure practices” (Notice of National Policy 51–201: 4460). Again, 
the objective is to “outline what we consider to be good disclosure 
practices, not to impose regulatory requirements” (ibid.: 4461). The CSA 
explicitly compares its policy initiative to the terms of Regulation Fair 
Dealing (FD) promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the U.S. Canadian securities legislation contains a specific 
prohibition against tipping, which is where someone in a “special 
relationship” with the reporting issuer informs anyone of a material fact 
or material change about the issuer before that material information has 
been “generally disclosed.” The policy indicates that posting information 
on a company website will not by itself satisfy the “generally disclosed” 
requirement because Internet access is not yet sufficiently widespread and 
because information thus posted to a website is not “effectively ‘pushed’ 
out to the marketplace” as opposed to investors seeking it for 
themselves (ibid.). The only entity that commented on this aspect of the 
proposed policy was a major Canadian law firm, McCarthy Tetrault, which 
disputed the viability of a distinction drawn in the policy between open 
conference calls accessible by the Internet (which would satisfy the 
“generally disclosed” requirement) and postings to an issuer’s website 
(which would not satisfy the requirement) (ibid.: 4480). The CSA 
defended this distinction by concluding that the former involved active 
 
dissemination because it would be preceded by a “broadly circulated news 
release containing particulars of the call and the matters to be discussed,” 
whereas a website posting would not involve such active dissemination. 
This was despite the law firm’s argument that technology could alert 
interested parties as to when information was posted on an issuer’s website 
(ibid.: 4481). 
Despite some level of flexibility accorded to issuers in relation to how 
they fulfil the requirements of these provisions, it is clear that the state 
regulators are still engaging in a certain amount of gatekeeping on 
behalf of investors. The distribution of risk as between issuers and 
investors implicit in these policies is also affected by the background 
condition that in Canada investors can still not easily sue issuers for 
misrepresentations in documents provided to the market beyond the 
moment of initial issue of the securities (i.e., in the so-called secondary 
trading market). 
 
B. REGULATION OF BROKERS 
Like the U.S., Canada has experienced the development of discount and 
online brokerage services, which have the capacity, as Vice-Chair Wetston 
acknowledged, to transform “the traditional broker–customer relationship 
as well as ma(k)e investors out of people with no previous experience or 
real understanding of the stock market” (Wetston 2000). Not surprisingly, 
the scale of online brokerage activity is much smaller in Canada than in the 
U.S. Currently, there are some fourteen online brokerage firms in Canada, 
 
mostly owned by Canadian banks, though Etrade has a Canadian subsidiary.7 
Deutsche Bank has an ownership interest in an online brokerage called 
Qtrade. In 2001 the CSA took action against three U.S. online brokers, 
Datek, Ameritrade, and TD Waterhouse (U.S.), who executed trades on 
U.S. markets for Canadian residents without being registered to trade 
in Canada. Each agreed to pay Cdn$800,000, to seek registration and to 
forthwith comply with the “gatekeeper and know your client obligations” 
of Canadian securities regulation.8 The CSA asserted its jurisdiction in these 
matters despite the fact that no complaints were made by customers resident 
in Canada concerning their accounts. 
As in other places, the big  regulatory development  in relation  to the 
impact of technology on broker activities has to do with the pressure to 
downgrade the obligations to be fulfilled by brokers in dealing with online 
clients. This issue is clearly connected to questions of the distribution of the 
risk of making investments as between investors and their advisors. The 
Canadian path to the removal of suitability requirements for the execution 
of online trades was influenced, as usual, by developments in the U.S., but also 
by specific Canadian concerns about the continued viability of the domestic 
brokerage industry. In 1997 the CSA proposed a new National Instrument, 
primarily intended to deal with the operation of toll-free lines and electronic 
trading of securities, particularly mutual funds, by financial institutions 
(Notice of Proposed National Instrument 33 –103). This was originally sparked 
by regulatory concern about conducting securities activities within retail 
offices of banks and trust companies. However, the scope of the proposal 
was not limited to the sale of mutual funds nor to trades by dealers related 
 
to financial institutions. The proposal purported to permit electronic 
trading of securities by registered dealers, provided that the system “does 
not accept transactions outside the suitability range for the client 
established by the dealer” and referred elsewhere “any order to purchase 
or sell securities outside the suitability range.” This proposal obviously 
suggests a reluctance to move away from reliance on suitability assessments 
made by dealers. 
In October 1998, a submission was made to the regulators by a group of ten 
Canadian discount brokerages, including all of the bank-owned ones, 
requesting that a “process of regulatory change to limit the application 
of the suitability rule only to brokers who provide advice or 
recommendations to customers” be initiated (Bank of Montreal Investor 
Services et al. 1998: 1). Note that the initiative for reform of the regulatory 
code here was taken by the intermediaries themselves. The arguments 
made in support of this proposition were formulated in terms of issues 
such as the need for consistency with U.S. rules, the nature of “regulatory 
and judicial trends” in the U.S. and Australia in support of such a move, 
the costs of compliance, and the associated disadvantage to Canadian 
brokers and stock exchanges in competing with counterparts in the U.S. 
The submission noted that commissions charged by Canadian discount 
brokers generally tended to be higher than those charged by their 
counterparts in the U.S., a source of “numerous inquiries” from customers. 
It argued that a customer who selects a discount broker has “implicitly 
made a suitability self-determination and implicitly indicated that he or 
she does not wish to pay for a suitability determination” (ibid.: 10). 
 
These pressures, it was argued, were exacerbated by the growth of 
electronic trading, such that if brokers in Canada failed to “keep pace with 
their counterparts in the United States, Canadian customers may turn to 
brokerages in the United States.” The group proposed a number of 
procedural safeguards if their request was met with a favorable response, 
including advance notification to customers that they would not be 
receiving advice or recommendations in connection with trades, and that 
customers who wished to maintain a full-service account would be able to 
do so, “provided that the accounts be maintained within separate divisions 
and appropriate safeguards implemented” (ibid.: 12). 
The CSA responded to this request in April 2000, when it announced 
that relief from suitability requirements would be granted on an application 
basis to dealers who only provided trade execution services for their clients 
(CSA 2000: 2683). Several conditions were imposed “in order . . . to 
safeguard the interests of investors,” which included the setting-up of a 
separate entity offering execution-only services. Furthermore, individuals 
were not to be compensated on the basis of the value of the transaction, 
and the dealer must obtain from the client an “informed acknowledgement” 
that no advice or recommendation or determination of suitability would 
be given by the dealer. It is clear that these conditions accorded closely 
with those suggested by the discount brokers. The approach of requiring 
specific client acknowledgement was also similar to the manner of 
regulation chosen in relation to electronic delivery of documents. On 
announcing this development, the Chair of the CSA said that “this relief 
from suitability obligations recognizes the changing needs of investors and 
 
the dealer community” and that the CSA would continue to work with 
the Investment Dealers Association (IDA)9 to explore similar relief for other 
categories of dealers while still “safeguarding the interests of investors.” A 
number of online brokerages applied for this relief from the suitability 
requirements, giving representations as to the conditions above 
enumerated.10 
The continued discussions that took place between the IDA and the CSA 
in 2000 –1 about the possibility of further extending relief from the 
suitability requirements to full-service brokers revolved around a number of 
issues. The IDA used three main arguments to bolster its submission that 
the CSA should abandon the “functional” approach – that the brokers 
themselves had suggested – to regulating suitability, in favor of a “trade-by-
trade” approach. These were the by-now familiar ones that: (i) other 
jurisdictions, notably the U.S. and Australia, had adopted the latter model; 
(ii) Canadian brokerages were being subjected to unfair competition 
because of the requirement to hive off execution services to a separate 
division; and (iii) broker obligations to clients would not diminish because 
of this initiative (IDA 2000 –1). Indeed, the IDA asserted that it was 
their clients’ initiative to seek this reform “in order to gain efficient 
access to the markets and their accounts” (ibid.: 15). With respect to the 
competition argument, the IDA claimed that the separate divisions 
requirement created an uneven playing field for them with respect to U.S. 
brokers. Because they did not have to incur these administrative costs, 
clients would shift to doing business with U.S. brokers on more favorable 
terms. Doing business with a U.S. broker would reduce the protection 
 
available to Canadian clients, who could not access Canadian investor-
protection funds and would find it more difficult to seek redress directly 
from the broker. Meanwhile the requirement created problems for small 
Canadian firms, less able to withstand the costs of establishing separate 
divisions, thus having an anti-competitive effect. 
With respect to the argument that client protection was not diminished 
by a move to trade-by-trade determinations of suitability, the IDA’s 
submission noted that the lack of transparency between two halves of the 
client’s trading account could mean greater risk of lack of diversification 
overall. Clients who wished to have recommendations for some trades and 
not for others would be denied the opportunity to deal with advisors of 
long-standing when making execution-only trades. Furthermore, the 
fiduciary duty owed by brokers to clients would not be diminished as a 
result of this reform.11 A possibility of client confusion about the nature 
of the services being offered was addressed by the IDA’s willingness to 
require member firms to obtain client acknowledgements of their 
understanding of the limitations of service being offered, to note whether 
the trade was “recommended” or “no advice given” on the trade 
confirmation, and to increase its supervision and review of trading activity 
to ensure appropriate compliance. This seems to be an example of 
decentered regulation being proposed to bolster the case for loosening 
existing restrictions, in a context of shifting understandings of investor 
exposure to risk. The IDA interpreted existing Canadian case law12 as 
standing for the proposition that not every client– broker relationship is 
fiduciary and noted that clients were perfectly free not to follow the 
 
advice of the broker, foregoing the right to complain in that instance 
(IDA 2000–1: 11, 15). 
In July 2001, the CSA approved the changes to the IDA bylaws and 
regulations on the topic of suitability (Notice of Commission Approval 
2001). The IDA’s commentary on its rule changes acknowledged that 
along with concern in both Canada and the U.S. that there is no rationale 
for applying the suitability rule to dealers who do not give advice to their 
clients, there was a further Canadian dimension. This was “the additional 
concern of the loss of brokerage business and stock exchange activity to 
the U.S. in light of the rise of electronic trading, the generally lower 
broker commissions offered by the U.S. discount brokers and the less 
onerous suitability obligations imposed on American dealers” (IDA 2001: 
2923). Furthermore, the IDA acknowledged that “compliance costs over 
time will be reduced without the requirement to conduct a suitability review 
for each and every transaction” (ibid.: 2924). It was also asserted that their 
new policies would be in the public interest by facilitating “an efficient, 
fair and competitive secondary market” (ibid.: 2926). This would be 
accomplished “by ensuring that investors receive the services they want 
and Member firms are able to offer services similar to those available in the 
U.S.” (ibid.). They should also “decrease delays that currently exist in the 
industry through increased transactional efficiency” (ibid.). The IDA 
concluded that “Investors have expressed a desire to make their own 
investment decisions in respect of their assets as evidenced by the growth of 
discount brokers in the industry today. Thus, investors are not looking for 
a paternalistic refusal by the dealer to process an order” (ibid.: 2927). 
 
A number of conditions for obtaining relief from suitability on a 
tradeby-trade basis were imposed. These were as follows: 
 
1. Where a firm wanted the flexibility to provide recommendations or not, new 
client application forms would have to request suitability information (age, 
investment objectives, risk tolerance, investment knowledge, net worth, 
and income) so that it could be reviewed for recommended transactions. 
2. Approval for suitability relief would have to be obtained from the IDA in 
accordance with its Policy No. 9. This policy, requiring disclosure of the 
fact that a firm will not be responsible for making suitability 
determinations when accepting an order that was not recommended is 
intended to ensure that “appropriate safeguards are implemented in 
order that clients will understand the differences in the types of 
transactions that they wish to execute, the possible risks associated with 
such transactions, and the client’s increased responsibilities when an 
order-execution only transaction is requested.” This would largely be 
accomplished by obtaining signed acknowledgements from clients as 
to their responsibility for their own investment decisions when no 
recommendation is provided. The policy also requires the disclosure to 
the client to include a brief description of what does and does not 
constitute a recommendation.13 
3. The policy also introduced supervisory systems to ensure that clients are 
not provided with recommendations where a suitability determination is 
not undertaken, including accurate marking of orders as recommended or 
non-recommended, monthly reviews of accounts, and trade confirmations 
 
to indicate if transaction was recommended or non-recommended. 
 
The end result of all this, then, is that full-service brokers in Canada are 
able to offer execution-only services to clients, who may opt in and out of 
an advising relationship with the broker as they see fit. While this 
enhancement of choice for the retail investor may be interpreted as an 
escape from paternalism, it also contributes to a shift in the ground rules 
for the operation of an industry that had been relied upon to perform classic 
intermediation and gatekeeping functions. It places more responsibility 
on the industry itself to ensure that the relevant safeguards to do with 
client understanding of service levels are working appropriately. In this 
sense, it is possible to see this example of policy formation as exhibiting 
decentered elements. Ironically, the de-emphasis on the intermediation 
and fiduciary functions to be performed by the brokerage industry may 
over time undermine the core arguments used to justify the self-
regulation of the industry. Significantly however, this example of a policy 
formation process proceeded along familiar lines, with industry groups 
concerned, at least in part, for their competitive position playing a pivotal 
role in the way legal governance in this area was formulated. 
In terms of our inquiry about risk as an element of the governance of 
(investor) populations, we have noted that the imposition of suitability 
requirements has always been about the management of the risk tolerance 
of investors. With the introduction of execution-only services provided by 
brokers in the online context, however, more of an onus is being placed on 
the investor to be aware of, and to contract for, the level of suitability 
 
assessment and advice she/he requires. Responsibility for overseeing the 
procedures for managing that aspect of the broker/investor relationship is 
primarily placed at the local-firm level. With these innovations, it seems 
likely that basic assumptions about the level of independent decision-making 
risk being assumed by retail investors in entering into the trading of 
securities may change. This development, coupled with the increasing 
recourse of individuals to equity markets to prepare for personal retirement 
well-being, as well as the evidence from behavioral finance theorists about 
the deficiencies of market decision-making by investors (Barber & Odean 
2001), suggests that a high price might ultimately be paid by investors in 
Canada for the protection of its brokerage industry from international 
competition. 
 
IV. REGULATING MARKETPLACES 
 
An issue that goes to the core of the growth of online investing is that of 
the proliferation of markets on which securities can be traded online. The 
development of trading technology makes it possible for more providers to 
enter the market for marketplaces. In the Canadian context, again 
following suit from the U.S., regulators recently considered the issue of 
what to do about so-called alternative trading systems (ATS), which 
provide automated matching systems bringing together orders from 
multiple buyers and sellers. In accordance with new economy imperatives, 
the policy debate was conducted using discourses of competition, 
efficiency, anonymity, choice, and cheaper information costs. However, 
 
along with these ideas came the peculiarly Canadian concern with market 
fragmentation and consequent illiquidity. What is different from the 
suitability example considered above is the somewhat broader cast of 
characters in relation to ATSs, which include established trading markets, 
and both institutional and retail investors. Canadian imperatives for the 
regulation of ATSs implicated at least two distinctive features of domestic 
capital markets, the size of the Canadian market for capital relative to that 
in the U.S., and the highly concentrated nature of the domestic financial 
services sector. In relation to the first issue, regulators articulated a fear 
that the advent of choices about marketplaces on which to trade securities 
would result in the development of a “capital market controlled and 
directed by other countries, in which only premium Canadian companies 
and major-league Canadian investors will be able to participate” (Brown 
1999). Thus the discourse of “the survival of an independent capital market in 
Canada” and a fear of being swamped by new players with agendas not 
consistent with Canadian national interests framed the policy debate 
about how to regulate ATSs. With specific reference to the growth of 
ATSs in the U.S., Brown noted that “Alternative trading systems are about 
choice. If money managers or investors don’t have that choice, they will 
take their business elsewhere.” 
Regulators presented the survival of Canadian capital markets as 
necessary to meet the needs of Canadian issuers and investors. However, 
another relevant aspect of the context here is the economics of the 
domestic financial services sector. In November 2000, William Hess, 
then the President and CEO of the Canadian Venture Exchange (CDNX) 
 
noted that the trading activities of all five of the bank-owned brokers on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange account for 53 percent of the TSX’s trading 
volume and ten brokerage firms represent 80 percent of the TSX’s volume. 
The fear articulated by the established exchanges then is as much about 
losing market share to competing ATSs set up by one or more large 
Canadian banks or investment dealers as it is about competitors from the 
U.S. (such as Instinet or Archipelago) entering the Canadian market for 
marketplaces. Added to this is what Brown describes as a measurable 
growth in the “upstairs” market, that is, the practice of crossing large 
blocks of shares for institutional customers off the exchange itself. 
Therefore, one hypothesis about stock exchange responses to the 
introduction of the new rules for the operation of ATSs is that they are 
concerned to protect their own ongoing economic interests. In 
preparation for the advent of competing markets, the provincial 
exchanges in Canada underwent some consolidation in the late 1990s, so 
that there are now three of them, the TSX for senior issuers, the TSX 
Venture Exchange for junior issuers,14 and the Montreal Exchange, which 
operates the only derivatives market. 
In August 2001, the CSA published its final instruments dealing with 
the regulation of marketplaces and trading (NIs 21–101 and 23 –101). The 
articulated goals of the rule are to “provide investor choice, improve price 
discovery, and decrease execution costs.” The primary elements of these 





The new framework to permit “the competitive operation of traditional 
exchanges and other marketplaces, while ensuring fairness and 
transparency” begins with the definition of a marketplace. This means: 
(a) an exchange; (b) a quotation and trade reporting system (QTRS);15 
or (c) a person or company that (i) constitutes, maintains or provides a 
market or facility for bringing together buyers and sellers of securities, 
(ii) brings together orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers, 
and (iii) uses established, non-discretionary methods under which orders 
interact and buyers and sellers agree to trade terms.16 The key feature of a 
marketplace then is the capacity to execute trades from multiple buyers and 
sellers. 
Meanwhile, an ATS means a marketplace that is not an exchange or 
QTRS and does not: (i) require issuers to enter into agreements to have 
their securities traded on the marketplace; (ii) provide a guarantee of a 
two-sided market on a continuous or reasonably continuous basis; (iii) set 
requirements governing the conduct of subscribers, except with respect to 
trading and creditworthiness (NI 21–101 CP §3.1(3)); and (iv) does not 
discipline subscribers other than by exclusion from participation in the 
marketplace. 
The characteristics of ATSs are established so as to draw a clear 
distinction between them and organized exchanges with respect to 
regulation of issuers, disciplining of members/subscribers, and a guarantee 
of a market. The absence of a guarantee of a two-sided market, which 
is also relevant in connection with the regulation of payments for order 
 
flow, imports some uncertainty about liquidity into the very definition of 
an ATS, despite the fact that increased liquidity is one of the policy goals 
of allowing ATSs to operate. Thus the regulation introduces a level of 
fragmentation and complexity into the very idea of a market, which is, as 
we have seen, one of the core mechanisms of neo-liberal policy. It also 
facilitates a range of options for the manner in which investors may be 
governed. 
In order to carry on business, an ATS must: (i) be registered as a dealer; 
(ii) be a member of a self-regulatory organization (SRO);17 and (iii) comply 
with the provisions of NI 21–101.18 Those who may trade are called 
“marketplace participants.” For an ATS, such a “participant” is called a 
“subscriber,” that is, someone who has entered into a contractual 
agreement with the ATS to access it “for the purpose of effecting trades or 
submitting, disseminating or displaying orders on the ATS.” There is 
no requirement that a subscriber be registered as a dealer, so both retail 
and institutional investors could be subscribers to an ATS.19 Indeed, one 
of the cited advantages of ATSs to institutional investors is that the 
possibility of being able to make trades directly, as opposed to through a 
dealer on the exchange, allows their trading to be more anonymous and 
therefore, if it involves large blocks, to have less of an adverse impact on 
pricing. Exchanges and QTRSs are not allowed to prohibit or limit 
members or users from effecting transactions on any marketplace (NI 21–
101: §5.2), nor are ATSs (ibid.: §6.12). ATSs have to disclose their 
trading fees to an information processor, including whether different 
fees are charged to subscribers and non-subscribers. They are not 
 
allowed to charge fees to non-subscribers such that they create barriers to 
access. 
 
B. WHAT CAN BE TRADED? 
A significant feature of the rules relating to ATSs in Canada is that, at 
present, the types of securities that can be traded on them are restricted to 
exchange-traded securities, corporate debt securities, government debt 
securities, and foreign exchange-traded securities. An earlier version of 
the rule had required only that an ATS security be a security issued by a 
reporting issuer in Canada, government debt, or a security listed or quoted 
on certain foreign markets. All three of the TSX, the CDNX (as it then 
was), and the IDA responded to this proposal with dire warnings about 
the implications of ATSs trading unlisted securities. The CDNX proposed 
that by not requiring issuers to be listed on an exchange or registered with 
a securities regulator “the potential for reputational damage to the 
Canadian capital markets is significant” (Hess 2000: 2). It asserted that the 
ATS proposal as it existed in 1999 “allows those companies that want to 
avoid scrutiny to go public outside of the closed system . . . and make a 
Canadian ATS their principal or sole marketplace, while avoiding the 
reporting issuer obligations in securities legislation.” The TSX was equally 
concerned about the possibility of ATSs “becoming a new home for trading in 
unlisted penny stocks” (Stymiest 2000: 14). In response to these views, the 
CSA amended the rule so that ATSs would only be permitted to trade 
the types of securities described above. This ensures that, at least in 
 
relation to equity securities,  those traded on an ATS are also traded on at 
least one more senior marketplace. Another way of putting this obviously, 
is to say that TSX and one or more ATS compete for orders related to 
securities listed on the TSX. 
However, a marketplace trading unlisted equity securities can apply for 
approval from the OSC. The first entity that sought to be regulated under 
the new rules was the Canadian Trading and Quotation System (CNQ). 
Regulatory approval for its operation as a QTRS was granted in March 
2003. This entity is “owned by a group of private investors” and trades 
non-exchange listed equity securities by approved IDA members. More 
generally, the rules allow an ATS that wants to trade over-the-counter 
equity securities to apply to the CSA. It may allow an ATS to trade these 
securities if it is not contrary to the public interest to do so. It should be 
noted, in connection with the issue of decentered regulation, that the 
government regulators retained discretionary decision-making power in 
relation to who could operate an online marketplace, or the terms on 
which it might operate. To determine the public interest in this respect, the 
CSA “look at a number of factors including whether there are appropriate 
arrangements for issuer regulation” (Notice of National Instruments, 
Companion Policies and Forms: 91). Thus, adequate arrangements for 






C. GROUND RULES FOR MARKET OPERATION 
All marketplaces are subject to requirements about information consolidation, 
market integration requirements, reporting/record-keeping requirements, 
and systems-capacity requirements. The information consolidation and 
market integration rules are an attempt to “preserve the benefits of a 
centralized market” (Kerbel and Wade 1999: 2), in the sense that 
information will be available to subscribers as to the prices at which 
securities are trading on other markets. Originally, the information 
transparency provisions would have required all marketplaces that display 
orders of exchange-traded securities or foreign exchange-traded securities 
to provide information on these orders to a data consolidator by 
December 2003 (NI 21–101: §7).20 In the meantime, marketplaces were 
required to provide details  of  all trades to an information vendor, which 
could be any one of a number of entities, such as the TSX or Reuters. 
This order and trade information must be provided to the information 
vendor in real-time or as close to real-time as possible. Before the rule was 
implemented, these transparency requirements were criticized by a number 
of industry participants on the ground of their cost to the industry and 
investors. Since then, the implementation of the requirement to provide 
information to a data consolidator has been delayed pending further 
investigation of the need for, and the appropriate extent of, information 
transparency requirements by an industry committee. In the meantime, 
an information vendor is expected to meet requirements imposed by a 
regulation services provider with respect to “the process, the business 
content of the reporting and regulatory data feeds, including the core data 
 
elements, the message catalogue and the service level standards” 
(Amendments to NI 21–101 CP: §1.1 (8)). 
Meanwhile, the market integration rules, which are designed to allow 
access to the orders displayed by the information processor, were intended 
to be introduced in two phases. In the first phase, to last until 1 January 
2004, marketplaces could not execute trades of securities unless they had 
an “electronic connection” to the “principal market” for the security. The 
principal market would be identified by the information processor, “following 
the enactment of the Instrument and each year” (NI 21–101 CP: §11.1(3)) 
as “the marketplace that had the largest trading volume for that security in that 
calendar year.” The connection to the principal market allows subscribers 
to an ATS to access orders in that market, if not in all marketplaces trading 
that security. The implication of this, of course, is that unregistered ATS 
subscribers, i.e., retail or institutional investors, could trade securities listed 
on the TSX without the intervention of a broker. This is particularly likely 
to be the case in the first period of operation of this system, since the 
principal market, at least initially, is the TSX. The other implication 
though is that during this transition phase, subscribers could see better 
offers from marketplaces other than the principal market, but were not 
able to access them directly. This suggests that fulfilling the goal of 





D. REGULATION OF ATSs 
A significant feature of the rule is that, as well as providing for the 
development of new marketplaces giving investors additional choices, 
marketplaces themselves also have choice about how they will be 
regulated. The options they may choose among are to be regulated as: (i) a 
member of an exchange; (ii) as an exchange; or (iii) as an ATS. An ATS 
will not be expected to discipline its subscribers or establish listing 
requirements for issuers. The approach of allowing choices among forms 
and intensity of regulation suggests that, as neo-liberal thinking would 
have it, regulation itself is being increasingly fragmented along with the 
markets, such that the intensity of regulation will vary among entities 
performing similar trading functions. 
National Instrument 23–101 sets out a number of minimum requirements 
as to how trading on all marketplaces is to be conducted. The substance of 
this instrument deals with prohibitions on manipulation and fraud in 
trading practices,22 the application of trading halts,23 best execution 
requirements, and establishment of trading hours. ATSs are exempt from 
the best execution requirements. More generally, marketplaces are exempt 
from the application of these rules if they comply with rules and policies 
established by a recognized exchange, a recognized QTRS, or a 
“regulation services provider,” whose rules will be reviewed and 
approved by the regulators. Other substantive provisions in an earlier 
version of this rule dealing with issues such as short selling, insider 
trading of securities of foreign nonreporting issuers, front running, an 
order exposure rule, and principal trading have been omitted altogether 
 
from the final version of the trading rules, and have been delegated down 
to regulation services providers to handle. This seems to suggest a level 
of decentering in relation to regulating the ongoing market activities of 
ATSs. The CSA will “review its proposed rules to determine if these 
provisions are included and whether the specific provisions  are  
appropriate  in  the  context  of  that  market,  marketplace  or security.” 
The logic here is that “identical provisions are not necessarily 
appropriate for each type of market, marketplace or each type of security.” 
This delegation down of the regulation-setting function may allow for the 
possibility of different trading rules for different marketplaces (and 
consequent possible confusion for investors), and also might require 
marketplaces to change their regulation depending on the type of 
security that trades there.24   Exchanges and QTRSs may  either  govern  the  
conduct  of  their members/users directly, or by agreement with a regulation 
services provider. The Companion Policy to NI 23 –101 indicates that the 
regulators expect marketplace participants to  transact  business  “openly  
and  fairly  and  in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade (NI 
23–101 CP: §1.2).” Meanwhile, as we have seen, ATSs cannot carry on 
business unless they are registered as dealers, are members of an SRO, and 
comply with NIs 21–101 and 23–101. ATSs have to keep subscribers’ 
trading information confidential, including the identity of subscribers and 
their orders unless the subscriber otherwise consents, or the information is 
required by law to be released (such as, presumably, insider reporting 
rules). They are required to provide risk disclosure to subscribers who are 
not dealers, to the effect that they do not ensure best execution for 
 
subscribers. Subscribers are required to acknowledge that they have 
received this disclosure before their first order is traded (NI 21–101: 
§6.11). Significantly, ATSs are required to enter into a contract with a 
“regulation services provider” that will set requirements for ATS trading, 
monitor the trading activities of the ATS and its subscribers, and enforce 
its own rules (NI 23–101: §8.2). The regulatory body for an ATS has to 
be recognized by the OSC before any ATS can start trading. The record-
keeping requirements for marketplaces are found in Part 11 of NI 21–101. 
ATSs also have to enter into agreements with their subscribers that the 
latter will comply with the requirements of the regulation services 
provider. This arrangement also appears to be consistent with neo-liberal 
modes of governing through decentralized contractual agreements rather 
than the content of regulation being centrally imposed by the government 
regulator. Indeed the very language of “regulation services provider,” used 
for the first time in Canadian securities regulation, turns on its head the 
notion of regulation as a set  of  authoritative  pronouncements from a 
centralized power and implies that “regulation services” are themselves 
another commodity to be bought and sold in the market. Again there is 
evidence of an increasing fragmentation of regulatory systems as well as of 
markets. However, the state regulators have retained the power to oversee the 
activities of regulation services providers, by way of, for example, 
requiring periodic reporting of their regulatory activities, approval of 
“significant changes” in the way regulation services are provided, and 
reporting of market misconduct if investors may suffer “serious damage” or 
there are grounds to believe fraud may be involved, as well as notification 
 
of “material systems failures and changes25 (In the Matter of Market 
Regulation Services 2002: 925). 
A specific regulatory issue that caused some controversy among 
commentators on the CSA’s draft rules in relation to ATSs was that of 
payment for order flow. The TSX wanted the CSA to prohibit this in its 
trading rules, on the basis that if ATSs were allowed to pay for order 
flow, this would create “a clear conflict of interest for firms routing client 
orders . . . based on financial benefits to the brokerage firm rather than . . . 
best execution.” On the other hand, the Investment Dealers Association, 
some of whose members might potentially establish ATSs themselves, 
“strongly oppose[d] a ban on payment for order flow or preferencing.” It 
argued that this would be anti-competitive, and the problem of conflict of 
interest could be adequately handled through a best-execution rule 
combined with monitoring by the relevant SRO. Ultimately the CSA took 
refuge in the idea that once “one party guarantees execution for a price, 
they have provided a guarantee of liquidity. Consequently that party must 
be recognized as an exchange.” As we have seen there is no best 
execution requirement for ATSs, only intermediaries. Similarly, an 
earlier version of the ATS rule would have prohibited owners of an 
ATS or their affiliates from trading securities on the ATS for their own 
account. This was apparently designed to prevent dealers with large 
volumes of trading from withdrawing from exchanges and setting up 
their own ATSs for their customers. This prohibition has disappeared 
from the final version of the rule. The implications here, obviously, are 
that an ATS could potentially trade for itself as a buyer or seller, in the 
 
absence of any best execution requirement. 
 
E. ENTER MARKET REGULATION SERVICES INC. 
As might be predicted by a scholar of decentering, the model of instituting a 
“regulation services provider” to regulate trading in an ATS was considered 
preferable to direct regulation by the CSA or to regulation of an ATS by 
the TSX, likely to be an ATS competitor and therefore not acceptable to 
them as a regulator. However the TSX moved quickly to, as it were, 
capture the market for regulation by establishing a company called Market 
Regulation Services Inc. (RS), which it jointly owns with the IDA. The 
TSX and TSX Venture have retained RS as their regulation services 
provider with the approval of securities regulators, and RS has been 
approved as an SRO in five provinces, including Ontario. The hope of RS’s 
owners is that it will be retained to provide similar services to other 
marketplaces. As the rules require that regulation services providers must 
be SROs, it is likely that this may occur. According to Tom Atkinson, 
the CEO of RS (Blackwell & Dixon 2001: B2), “a few [ATSs]” approached 
RS about providing regulatory services soon after its inception. These 
include CNQ, which began operating in summer 2003, and which has 
retained RS to provide it with market surveillance and regulatory oversight 
services. 
The recognition order granted to RS by the government regulator in 
January 2002 includes terms and conditions in relation to corporate 
governance, fees chargeable, access of ATSs to RS’s services, financial 
 
viability, systems capacity, as well as the rule-making and discipline 
exercisable by RS. Thus it is arguable that a relatively detailed template of 
internal organization and ongoing operation has been provided to RS by 
the regulators. For example, RS is required to have a board where at least 
50 percent of its directors are “independent,” as defined in the order, 
and where “at all times,” at least one of its directors represents ATSs. It 
is not allowed to “unreasonably prohibit or limit access to its regulation 
services.” In relation to financial viability, RS is required to operate on 
a not-for-profit basis, and to have a “risk management policy that will 
allow it to identify issues that may prevent it from allocating sufficient 
financial and other resources to carry out its regulation functions in a 
manner that is consistent with the public interest.” Its fee structure is 
composed of a relatively modest fixed annual fee chargeable to 
“participating organizations” of TSX or TSX Venture or ATS subscribers, 
and a variable fee per shares traded. New marketplaces are also charged a 
one-time fee for providing them with a connection to RS’s systems. Its 
rules, which must be filed with regulators, are required to be “not 
contrary” to the public interest and to ensure compliance with securities 
legislation, prevent fraud, and promote just and equitable principles of trade. 
In an early news release, Atkinson described RS as Canada’s first 
“independent and national market regulator.” RS’s mission is described 
as being to “develop, administer, surveil, and enforce market integrity 
rules applicable to trading in Canadian securities markets in a neutral, cost 
effective, service oriented and responsive manner that does not preference 
one type of market over another.” The TSX and TSX Venture have 
 
promulgated a set of Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIRs), which 
are being used by RS to regulate the markets for which it is the 
regulation services provider. These rules apply to the operation of 
marketplaces (such as order entry, transaction record, and trading halt 
rules), participants26  (including conduct of business in accordance with just 
and equitable principles of trade, prohibition against short selling, and 
front running), and access persons. In August 2002, RS published a set 
of sanction guidelines for its disciplinary proceedings, indicating the range 
of monetary and other sanctions that would be applied for breach of 
UMIRs provisions. 
In a recent interview, Atkinson repeated a view that he expressed when 
RS was first established, to the effect that “Enforcement is probably the 
least effective form of enhancing market integrity” (Tedesco 2003: FP6). 
The same  source reports that “during  its inaugural year,  RS has issued 
300,000 alerts to traders for possible rule violations; it has vetted over 
40,000 corporate press releases and on average, monitored 110,000 trades a 
day.” It has also made a request to the CSA for “sweeping powers, among 
them the ability to subpoena witnesses, to compel individuals and companies 
to co-operate during investigations and to appear before a disciplinary 
panel; and enable them to collect on the financial penalties resulting from 
disciplinary action.” 
It is worth noting that the model adopted here, where a provider 
contracts to provide regulation services to a market, results in the 
regulator being functionally detached from the market. This detachment 
has been something for which state regulators were regularly criticized. 
 
The model adopted here is clearly something of a “third way,” in that it is 
neither state nor self-regulation as these have been generally understood. 
Is it decentered? The commodification of regulatory power implied in this 
model does suggest a destabilizing of the state command-and-control 
model. However, the fact that in practice, the TSX and IDA are currently 
the owners of the regulation services provider27 suggests that the model in 
Ontario is in fact closer to self-regulation, with theoretical competition 
among regulators for the business of regulating markets providing a 
“new economy” spin. These established interests appear to have 
maintained their influence over a regulatory process designed to promote 





The evidence presented here reaffirms the point that if the growth of online 
investing is associated with neo-liberal competition and entrepreneurship 
among market providers and intermediaries, competition is also being 
managed by regulatory processes (Braithwaite 2000). In terms of our 
empirical inquiry into whether the approach to regulating online investing 
in Canada exhibits a commitment to decentering the state, the results can 
be described as somewhat mixed. On the one hand, delegating 
responsibility to individual brokerage firms for monitoring the operation of 
suitability disclosure in relation to online transactions and allowing issuers 
flexibility about the presentation of Internet-based prospectus material 
 
suggests a minimal role for state regulation. Adopting a market model 
of regulatory structure in relation to ATSs – by way of the innovation 
of the “regulation services provider” – seems to be the clearest example 
of decentering the state. On the other hand, this market model is 
accompanied by a relatively robust system of state oversight. Similarly, 
we have noted that a generally conservative approach has been taken in 
Canada to the use of the Internet for document delivery and disclosure. In 
this sense, Braithwaites’ observation that the role of government in the 
“new regulatory state” is to regulate the standards of private-sector service 
providers is demonstrably reinforced (ibid.: 226). But while it is clear that 
the form and nature of the regulatory strategies being employed in the 
online investing sphere are becoming more variable and multi-institutional, 
the evidence does not appear to support the more radical proposition that 
“authority itself” is being devolved (ibid.: 228). In particular, the 
phenomenon of using investing technology itself to do the regulating, 
which might be considered the pinnacle of an embedded approach to the 
regulation of online investing, is not yet a pervasive feature (Black 2001: 
138). 
The other prong of our inquiry – empirical evidence of a shift to risk 
governance as a modality of regulating – has again produced ambiguous 
results, in the sense that “risk knowledges” appear to be selectively 
mobilized (Valverde, Levi & Moore 2003). While the capacity for online 
brokers to offer execution-only services to investors might well be 
construed as a  redistribution  of  the  risk  of  making  investment  
decisions  from  intermediaries to customers, when the context shifts to 
 
the delivery of issuer documents, regulators were reluctant to engage in a 
similar redistribution. The marketizing of the regulatory apparatus for 
ATSs suggests that individual and institutional investors might have to 
factor in the credibility of the regulatory structure in making decisions 
about where to trade. Investors will increasingly be contracting for 
regulatory effectiveness as part of making investment choices. The absence 
of a best-execution requirement for ATSs may increase the level of risk 
incurred by investors choosing an ATS as their trading platform. Yet 
discourses of risk and risk management appear to be targeted 
predominantly at individual investors rather than more established industry 
players. The approach to setting ground rules for the operation of ATSs 
could be interpreted in terms of regulators managing the risks of their 
arrival by way of rules about what can be traded, transparency 
obligations, and, significantly, requirements for regulatory services. Yet, it 
is apparent that the emerging regulation of ATSs in Canada is also 
oriented around traditional legal discourses of avoiding conflicts of interest in 
the operation of new markets or even public choice discourses about 
accommodating the ongoing economic interests of established institutional 
entities. What the case of regulating online investing in the Canadian 
context does seem to make clear, however, is the need to pay careful 
attention to the politics of decentering and risk governance. The absence 
of individual investor voices in debates about how to regulate in this field 
is notable. The decentering impulse driving both the online suitability 
assessment issue and the regulation of ATSs was clearly connected to the 
economic interests of repeat players in the field, such as investment banks 
 
with online brokerage subsidiaries, as well as the TSX and IDA, the 
owners of RS. In relation to risk governance, this case study provides 
scope for an argument that while individual investors might be 
increasingly governed through this modality, with online trading 
technology being interpreted as a source of risk to them, institutional 
entities like brokerage houses or new marketplaces are given more 
autonomy about whether or not, or how, to engage with discourses of 
risk management. In other words, it remains important to explore the 
political conditions under which risk discourses are mobilized 
(McCluskey 2002; Valverde Levi & Moore 2003). Given these realities, 
there is room for skepticism that the online investing context will produce a 
significantly greater degree of investment market democracy in Canada. 
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1. Securities regulation in Canada is provincial, so that provincial regulators make 
regulation and policy affecting that province only. However, an umbrella 
organization called the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) has over 
the last few years attempted to promote a harmonized approach to Canadian 
securities regulation by promulgating “national instruments” or “national 
 
policies” that may be adopted as rule or policy in individual provinces. 
2. Kingsford Smith provides an insightful account of the development of this 
perspective in her paper in this volume. See also Black (2001). 
3. Thus, these information sheets contain comments such as “If you are 
considering an online investing opportunity, keep in mind that the Internet is 
unregulated . . . just because information is available doesn’t necessarily mean 
it’s true” (Beware of Internet Investing: Scams); “While computers can speed up 
the trading process, don’t make the mistake of thinking trades happen instantly” 
and “While trading on margin may magnify the size of your returns, it is risky 
because it also magnifies the size of any losses” (Thinking of Investing Online?); 
“Investors who venture into the online world . . . should keep in mind that the 
power of the Internet is also being exploited by investment con artists and 
fastbuck operators who want nothing more than to separate you from your 
hard earned money” (Investing and the Internet – Be Alert to Signs of Fraud). 
4. In Canada, the document that provides this information to investors is known 
as a prospectus. 
5. Thus “where delivery is intended by posting a document, such as on the Internet, 
the notice requirement could be satisfied by providing notice to each intended 
recipient at the time that a document is available or by obtaining the recipient’s 
prior informed consent to this form of delivery” (Requests for Comments 1999: 
7786). As to evidence of delivery, the CSA view is that “the best form of evidence 
of electronic delivery is proof that a document was sent electronically in 
accordance with the terms of the prior consent of the recipient” (ibid.: 7788). 
6. This is the term used to describe the permissible limits of information about the 
business entity and the security being offered that can be provided to potential 
investors by investment bankers in advance of the prospectus being approved by 
regulators. 
 
7. Charles Schwab Canada was purchased in 2002 by Bank of Nova Scotia. 
8. These are now to be found in Rules 31–505 (Conditions of Registration) and 31– 
502 (Proficiency Requirements). 
9. The IDA is the main self-regulatory organization for brokers and dealers in 
Canada. 
10. They undertook to continue to adhere to the suitability requirements for those 
clients from whom an acknowledgement was not obtained for a  six-month 
period following the date of the application decision. However, some were 
required to make applications to extend this period for a further six months in 
order to have additional time to obtain the client acknowledgments. 
11. A concern expressed by the CSA that there could be a conflict of interest 
resulting from referral payments made by order-execution only brokers to their 
fellow broker-advisors was dismissed by the IDA as “unrealistic” and “contrary 
to the successful operation of an individual broker’s full-service business.” 
12. Notably Varcoe v Sterling 1992. 
13. Here an IDA notice to members indicates that making “investment 
information” (e.g. news, research, opinions, asset allocation models, portfolio 
tracking information, public disclosure documents, etc.) available to one or more 
customers would not constitute a recommendation provided that a proposal is 
not “individually tailored for the particular customer or class of customers.” 
Related to this, if a customer “sets out the parameters of the types of 
investment information that he or she wishes to receive,” providing that 
information would not be considered a recommendation. On the other hand, 
systems for “data mining” customers’ habits and investment preferences based 
on past investment decisions and using this to target investment-related 
information to those customers might constitute a recommendation. A 
recommendation might also be involved where the broker held herself out as 
 
taking into account the customer’s objectives and financial situation in relation 
to a transaction. 
14. This used to be the Canadian Venture Exchange (CDNX) until it was acquired 
by the TSX in 2001. 
15. This is a person or company other than an exchange or registered dealer, that 
operates facilities permitting the dissemination of price quotations for the 
purchase and sale of securities and reports of completed transactions in 
securities for the exclusive use of registered dealers. 
16. Such non-discretionary methods include rules imposing execution priorities, e.g., 
time and price priority rules. A person or company brings together orders for 
securities if it displays trading interests entered on the system or receives orders 
centrally for processing and execution (NI 21–101 CP: §2.1(3)). 
17. The requirement of membership in an SRO is intended to ensure that investors 
are protected by the Canadian Investor Protection Fund as well as SRO 
regulations about capital requirements for members. The regulation 
acknowledged that at this time the only SRO available for an ATS to join 
was the IDA, the SRO for brokers and dealers. Unlike the TSX, the IDA 
does not operate a market itself. TSX member regulation functions were 
recently transferred to the IDA, in connection with the demutualization of the 
Exchange. 
18. Section 6.7 of the instrument requires an ATS to notify the regulators if its 
trading volumes or dollar values of any “type of security” are equal to or greater 
than 20 percent of all value or volume in that type of security on all 
marketplaces in Canada. Once those thresholds of “market dominance” are 
reached, the regulators will consider whether the ATS is more appropriately 
considered to be an exchange, even if it is not performing the functions that 
distinguish an exchange from an ATS, such as listing issuers or disciplining 
members. 
 
19. The structure of the registration requirements for securities trading is such that 
investors generally are only exempt from them if they “trade through an agent 
who is a registered dealer.” This is accomplished by the ATS being designated 
as a dealer for some purposes. 
20. Marketplaces have to provide at least information on the type, the issuer, the 
class, the symbol and the series of the security, the five best bid prices and five 
best ask prices for each security displayed, and the total disclosed volume at each 
of those prices. 
21. Beyond January 2004, marketplaces were to be required to have agreements with 
a market integrator and to comply with its requirements, or if none exists, they 
were to “establish and maintain electronic connection to all other marketplaces 
trading the same securities.” The companion policy to the rule indicates that 
“Phase 2 integration will establish more complete market integration and order 
routing between all marketplaces in order to ensure that there will be price 
protection for all orders between all competing marketplaces” (NI 21–101 CP: 
§11.1(5)). So ATSs would at this point have to take responsibility for facilitating 
the access of their subscribers to all marketplaces trading the same securities. It 
should be noted of course that there is no requirement to automatically route 
orders to the best priced market, since ATSs have no duty of best execution (NI 
23–101, Part 4). The CSA would have considered an ATS not to be in 
compliance with this access requirement if it responded to orders from non-
participants more slowly than from its own participants, or it used different 
technology that did not provide equivalent service to execute non-participant 
orders, or it charged fees which had the effect of creating a barrier to access 
for non-marketplace participants. Again there was criticism of this requirement 
by industry participants on the ground of the cost and complexity involved in 
achieving connectivity. The CSA has now, as of January 2004, backed away from 
the more robust requirement for market integration, by deleting the concept of 
 
“market integrator” in the rules. Instead the focus will be on “ensuring 
compliance with best execution requirements for dealers and fair access 
requirements for marketplaces” (Notice of Proposed Amendments to NI 21–
101: 4379). 
22. These include: wash trading or effecting transactions that have the effect of 
artificially raising/lowering or maintaining prices. See NI 23–101 CP: §3.1. 
23. Here the idea is that if one marketplace halts trading in a particular security, no 
other marketplace can trade it either. 
24. For example, if a marketplace began trading foreign non-reporting issuer 
securities. 
25. For an example of the terms of an “oversight program,” see the Memorandum 
of Understanding regarding oversight of Market Regulation Services Inc. 
between the Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec, Manitoba, and Ontario 
Securities Commissions. 
26. These are members of an exchange or dealers operating on an ATS, but not 
those who are merely “subscribers” to an ATS. 
27. An example of the complex relationship between RS and at least one of its 
owners, the TSX, is an issue that caused some controversy among those 
interested parties that commented on the proposed structure and operation 
of RS before its approval by the regulators. This was the fact that the TSX 
charges RS for the use of its surveillance systems, which may then be used by 
RS to surveil markets other than the TSX. RS agreed to investigate the cost 
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